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Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2015

Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games

Abstract

We introduce the model of Stochastic Revision Games where a finite set of players control a state variable and receive payoffs as a function of the state at a terminal deadline. There is a Poisson clock which dictates when players are called to choose of revise their actions. This paper studies the existence of Markov perfect equilibria in those games. We give an existence proof assuming some form of correlation.
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hal-02002783 , version 1 (31-01-2019)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02002783 , version 1

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Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala. Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games. 2015. ⟨hal-02002783⟩
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