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Journal Articles Mathematics of Operations Research Year : 2013

Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games

Abstract

This paper considers a general model of repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We study belief-free communication equilibria (BFCE) defined as follows. Players communicate with a mediator who receives types and signals and recommends actions. A BFCE is a communication device such that all players have an incentive to play faithfully, irrespectively of their belief about the state. We characterize BFCE payoffs for any repeated game with incomplete information in terms of one-shot payoff functions, information, and signaling structure.
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Dates and versions

hal-01026126 , version 1 (19-07-2014)

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Tristan Tomala. Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2013, 38 (4), pp.617-637. ⟨10.1287/moor.2013.0594⟩. ⟨hal-01026126⟩

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