Continua of Underemployment Equilibria Reflecting Coordination Failures, Also at Walrasian Prices - HEC Paris - École des hautes études commerciales de Paris Access content directly
Reports Year : 2001

Continua of Underemployment Equilibria Reflecting Coordination Failures, Also at Walrasian Prices

Abstract

In this paper the existence of unemployment is partly explained as being the result of coordination failures. It is shown that as a result of self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations, even at Walrasian prices, a continuum of equilibria results, among which an equilibrium with approximately no trade and a Walrasian equilibrium. These coordination failures also arise at other price systems, but then unemployment is the result of both a wrong price system and coordination failures. Some properties of the set of equilibria are analyzed. Generically, there exists a continuum of non-indifferent equilibrium allocations. Under a condition implied by gross substitutability, there exists a continuum of equilibrium allocations in the neighborhood of a competitive allocation, when prices are Walrasian. For a specialized economy, a dynamic illustration is offered.
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Dates and versions

hal-00597197 , version 1 (31-05-2011)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00597197 , version 1

Cite

Alessandro Citanna, Hervé Crès, Jacques H. Drèze, Jean-Jacques Herings, Antonio Villanacci. Continua of Underemployment Equilibria Reflecting Coordination Failures, Also at Walrasian Prices. 2001. ⟨hal-00597197⟩

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