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Reports Year : 2002

On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects

Gian Luigi Albano
  • Function : Author
Fabrizio Germano
  • Function : Author

Abstract

We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We first derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence between the JAMO and the Survival Auction which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Then, we prove that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO do not have a counterpart in the JAMO. However, it is shown that certain collusive equilibria based on retaliatory strategies do exist in both auctions.
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Dates and versions

hal-00593867 , version 1 (17-05-2011)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00593867 , version 1

Cite

Stefano Lovo, Gian Luigi Albano, Fabrizio Germano. On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects. 2002. ⟨hal-00593867⟩

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