Continuous-Time Games of Timing - HEC Paris - École des hautes études commerciales de Paris Access content directly
Reports Year : 2003

Continuous-Time Games of Timing

Abstract

We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.
No file

Dates and versions

hal-00591682 , version 1 (09-05-2011)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00591682 , version 1

Cite

Rida Laraki, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille. Continuous-Time Games of Timing. 2003. ⟨hal-00591682⟩

Collections

X HEC CNRS LARA
117 View
0 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More