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Rapport Année : 2003

Continuous-Time Games of Timing

Résumé

We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.
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Dates et versions

hal-00591682 , version 1 (09-05-2011)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00591682 , version 1

Citer

Rida Laraki, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille. Continuous-Time Games of Timing. 2003. ⟨hal-00591682⟩

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