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Rapport Année : 2004

On Subgame-Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect monitoring

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Dates et versions

hal-00587231 , version 1 (19-04-2011)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00587231 , version 1

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Tristan Tomala. On Subgame-Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect monitoring. 2004. ⟨hal-00587231⟩

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