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Reports Year : 2007

Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information

Johannes Hörner
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Abstract

We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
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Dates and versions

hal-00580152 , version 1 (26-03-2011)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00580152 , version 1

Cite

Stefano Lovo, Johannes Hörner. Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information. 2007. ⟨hal-00580152⟩

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