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Journal Articles Social Choice and Welfare Year : 1998

A strong paradox of multiple elections

Abstract

We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes.

Dates and versions

hal-00541791 , version 1 (01-12-2010)

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Marco Scarsini. A strong paradox of multiple elections. Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, Vol. 15, N°2, pp. 237-238. ⟨10.1007/s003550050102⟩. ⟨hal-00541791⟩

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