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Conference Papers Year : 2009

Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs

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hal-00495690 , version 1 (28-06-2010)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00495690 , version 1

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Tristan Tomala, J. Hörner, S. Lovo. Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs. Conférence Théorie des jeux et applications, May 2009, Marseille, France. ⟨hal-00495690⟩

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