Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes - HEC Paris - École des hautes études commerciales de Paris Access content directly
Journal Articles Journal of Political Economy Year : 2004

Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes

D. Samet
  • Function : Author
D. Schmeidler
  • Function : Author


Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society's utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.


No file

Dates and versions

hal-00481249 , version 1 (06-05-2010)



Itzhak Gilboa, D. Samet, D. Schmeidler. Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes. Journal of Political Economy, 2004, vol. 112, pp.932-938. ⟨10.1086/421173⟩. ⟨hal-00481249⟩


95 View
0 Download



Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More