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Journal Articles Games and Economic Behavior Year : 2009

Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Abstract

This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems, J. Math. Econ. 10, 67–81] communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.

Dates and versions

hal-00464537 , version 1 (17-03-2010)

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Tristan Tomala. Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, Vol.67,n°2, pp.682-694. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005⟩. ⟨hal-00464537⟩

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