Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities - HEC Paris - École des hautes études commerciales de Paris Access content directly
Journal Articles Journal of Mathematical Economics Year : 2002

Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities

Abstract

We study an economy with competitive commodity markets and exclusive pairwise contractual relations with moral hazard, where both the principal and the agent can be risk averse. We show existence of equilibria and their generic constrained suboptimality, by means of a change in the compensation schemes. Such suboptimality occurs provided the number of commodities is sufficiently large relative to the number of states and pair types, and there are at least three future states of the world.

Dates and versions

hal-00463221 , version 1 (11-03-2010)

Identifiers

Cite

Alessandro Citanna, Antonio Villanacci. Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002, Vol.38,n°1-2, pp.117-147. ⟨10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00070-8⟩. ⟨hal-00463221⟩

Collections

HEC CNRS
39 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More