%0 Journal Article
%T Positive value of information in games
%+ Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH)
%+ Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali
%+ Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA)
%+ CREST-LEI
%A Scarsini, Marco
%A Bassan, Bruno
%A Gossner, Olivier
%A Zamir, Shmuel
%< avec comité de lecture
%@ 0020-7276
%J International Journal of Game Theory
%I Springer Verlag
%V Vol. 32
%P pp. 17-31
%8 2003
%D 2003
%R 10.1007/s001820300142
%K Information structures
%K Value of Information
%K Pareto Optima
%Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.ecoJournal articles
%X We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments `a la Blackwell. More specifically, we consider pairs consisting of a game with incomplete information G and an information structure S such that the extended game (G,S) has a unique Pareto payoff profile u. We prove that u is a Nash payoff profile of (G,S), and that for any information structure T that is coarser than S, all Nash payoff profiles of (G,S) are dominated by u. We then prove that our condition is also necessary in the following sense: Given any convex compact polyhedron of payoff profiles, whose Pareto frontier is not a singleton, there exists an extended game (G,S) with that polyhedron as the convex hull of feasible payoffs, an information structure T coarser than S and a player i who strictly prefers a Nash equilibrium in (G,S) to any Nash equilibrium in (G,S).
%G English
%L hal-00539798
%U https://hec.hal.science/hal-00539798
%~ SHS
%~ HEC
%~ CNRS
%~ UNIV-CERGY
%~ AO-ECONOMIE
%~ THEMA-UMR8184
%~ CY-TECH-SM