%0 Journal Article %T Positive value of information in games %+ Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH) %+ Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali %+ Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA) %+ CREST-LEI %A Scarsini, Marco %A Bassan, Bruno %A Gossner, Olivier %A Zamir, Shmuel %< avec comité de lecture %@ 0020-7276 %J International Journal of Game Theory %I Springer Verlag %V Vol. 32 %P pp. 17-31 %8 2003 %D 2003 %R 10.1007/s001820300142 %K Information structures %K Value of Information %K Pareto Optima %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.ecoJournal articles %X We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments `a la Blackwell. More specifically, we consider pairs consisting of a game with incomplete information G and an information structure S such that the extended game (G,S) has a unique Pareto payoff profile u. We prove that u is a Nash payoff profile of (G,S), and that for any information structure T that is coarser than S, all Nash payoff profiles of (G,S) are dominated by u. We then prove that our condition is also necessary in the following sense: Given any convex compact polyhedron of payoff profiles, whose Pareto frontier is not a singleton, there exists an extended game (G,S) with that polyhedron as the convex hull of feasible payoffs, an information structure T coarser than S and a player i who strictly prefers a Nash equilibrium in (G,S) to any Nash equilibrium in (G,S). %G English %L hal-00539798 %U https://hec.hal.science/hal-00539798 %~ SHS %~ HEC %~ CNRS %~ UNIV-CERGY %~ AO-ECONOMIE %~ THEMA-UMR8184 %~ CY-TECH-SM