%0 Journal Article %T Stopping games with randomized strategies %+ Laboratoire Analyse, Géométrie et Applications (LAGA) %+ Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH) %+ Tel Aviv University (TAU) %A Rosenberg, Dinah %A Vieille, Nicolas %A Solan, Eilon %< avec comité de lecture %@ 0178-8051 %J Probability Theory and Related Fields %I Springer Verlag %V Vol.119,n°3 %P pp.433-451 %8 2001-03-01 %D 2001 %R 10.1007/PL00008766 %K Stopping games %K randomized strategies %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.ecoJournal articles %X We study stopping games in the setup of Neveu. We prove the existence of a uniform value (in a sense defined below), by allowing the players to use randomized strategies. In constrast with previous work, we make no comparison assumption on the payoff processes. Moreover, we prove that the value is the limit of discounted values, and we construct ε-optimal strategies. %G English %L hal-00465029 %U https://hec.hal.science/hal-00465029 %~ SHS %~ UNIV-PARIS13 %~ HEC %~ UNIV-PARIS8 %~ CNRS %~ LAGA %~ AO-ECONOMIE %~ GALILE %~ UNIV-PARIS-LUMIERES %~ SORBONNE-PARIS-NORD %~ UNIV-PARIS8-OA