%0 Journal Article %T Continuous-time games of timing %+ Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH) %+ Tel Aviv University (TAU) %+ Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO) %A Vieille, Nicolas %A Solan, Eilon %A Laraki, Rida %< avec comité de lecture %@ 0022-0531 %J Journal of Economic Theory %I Elsevier %V Vol.120,n°2 %P pp.206-238 %8 2005-02-01 %D 2005 %R 10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001 %K Timing games %K Continuous-time games %K Games of timing %K War of attrition %K Preemption games %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.ecoJournal articles %X We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect var epsilon-equilibrium, for each var epsilon>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established. %G English %L hal-00464672 %U https://hec.hal.science/hal-00464672 %~ SHS %~ X %~ HEC %~ CNRS %~ AO-ECONOMIE %~ X-DEP