%0 Journal Article %T Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information %+ Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH) %A Lovo, Stefano %A Hörner, Johannes %A Tomala, Tristan %< avec comité de lecture %@ 0012-9682 %J Econometrica %I Econometric Society %V Vol.77,n°2 %P pp.453-487 %8 2009-03-01 %D 2009 %K Belief-free Equilibria %K Games with incomplete information %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration/domain_shs.gestion.finJournal articles %X We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations. %G English %L hal-00459955 %U https://hec.hal.science/hal-00459955 %~ SHS %~ HEC %~ CNRS